In an effort to contribute to such mid-range theoretical development, this article presents three arguments about the legitimacy of non-profit TNGOs in global governance. First, as a practical matter for these actors, legitimacy matters. The presence or absence of legitimacy has important effects on the outcome of policy advocacy by TNGOs. To have an impact on outcomes, TNGOs advocating for new norms or policy change by and among states, international institutions, or other non-state actors, domestically or internationally, must be accepted as legitimate by these varied audiences.
Although insufficient on its own, legitimacy is a necessary condition for effective advocacy. Second, the acceptance of a particular TNGO as a legitimate actor in policy advocacy depends on the values of the audiences for the TNGO's advocacy, which confer that legitimacy. In other words, the legitimacy of TNGOs is most appropriately conceived as a relational, sociological, and empirical question rather than a quality Thomson, 2004) . Collingwood has identified the contours of these ongoing debates. 11 Following Collingwood (2006) , "TNGO" is used here as an umbrella term, capturing a range of organizational approaches, where "transnational" describes organizations that operate in and across a number of different countries. While TNGOs perform a range of functions in global governance, the focus here is on norm entrepreneurial and policy advocacy functions.
inherent in an organization or its characteristics. Thus to assess and understand TNGO legitimacy in practice requires attention to the values, identities, outlooks and interests on both sides of the relationship in any given context: the TNGO advocate and the target audience. Crucially, the very same 'source' of TNGO legitimacy in the eyes of one audience can be viewed with suspicion and as non-legitimate by another. Third, the legitimacy of TNGOs should be understood as a strategic resource: an asset for advocacy that NGOs can seek strategically to generate and cultivate, endogenously. Where TNGOs gain acceptance as legitimate advocates for policy change, the probability of their success in leading change is greatly increased. Where they fail to do so, the effectiveness of their advocacy will be limited.
The article illustrates and supports these arguments through a comparative analysis of two related anti-corruption advocacy initiatives by Transparency International (TI), the leading TNGO in the international regime of anti-corruption. The first involves
TI's activities in Germany in the period leading up to and immediately following the conclusion of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, the centerpiece of the international regime focused on criminalizing transnational business bribery. In this case, the business and policy elites who were the target of TI's anti-bribery advocacy accepted this TNGO as highly legitimate, due in large part to the elite personal relationships of its leaders and its non-confrontational strategy. Although Germany had been a longstanding supporter of transnational business bribery through policies permitting its tax-deductibility -and had opposed international criminalization -TI was able to exploit its legitimacy and effectively pressure German business and political elites to swiftly comply with the OECD anti-bribery Convention -a significant policy shift -despite important and countervailing material interests.
The second case comprises the activities of TI in France during the same period concerning the same issues. Here, the very same elite relationships and nonconfrontational strategies which conferred legitimacy in Germany worked against TI in
France. In direct contrast to its German experience, Transparency International in France notably failed to achieve legitimacy among key business and political elites. As a result, its policy advocacy in favour of the OECD Convention was ineffectual. Like Germany, 
The Legitimacy of TNGOs in Global Governance
Legitimacy is notoriously difficult to define. Most simply put, the notion of something or someone being legitimate reflects a stamp of approval associated with being right, appropriate, empowered or agreed upon according to some set of rules. Collingwood puts it, moreover, the concept is "multi-leveled, simultaneously implying both agreement with the rules (whatever these may be) and -following Weber's understanding of the concept -the perception that the behaviour in question is legitimate." 16 To some degree then, like beauty, legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder;
it depends on perception and relationship.
Generally speaking, the literature on TNGOs in global governance has tended to emphasize normative, a priori sources of TNGO legitimacy. Amidst the up-swell in TNGO activity at the UN and in world politics generally during the 1990s, early research on the legitimacy of NGOs and various social movements tended to tie legitimacy normatively to a set of outcome criteria linked to democratic governance and theories of democracy. NGOs and a robust global civil society were seen as part of the solution to the growing "legitimacy gap" in global governance. 17 Later studies identified legitimacy problems associated with integrating TNGOs into the structures of global governance. As these organizations typically originated from the richer, western countries of the northern hemisphere, skeptics argued, they would likely further tip the balance of interests against those of the southern hemisphere and contribute to the fragmentation, privatization, and further de-legitimization of an already unjust global order. 18 Hence, they were considered to lack legitimacy. In addition, to those whose view of the international political system privileged a state-centric conception of world order, the advocacy and governance Putting aside the question of whether TNGOs per se lack legitimacy in global governance, the question in the case of a particular TNGO's norm entrepreneurship and policy advocacy is to explore whether, how, and why that TNGO achieves or fails to achieve sufficient legitimacy to influence politics in any direction; to have, so to speak, "standing" on the matter. Rather than attempting to catalogue the purported a priori bases of legitimacy, the present discussion is explicitly empirical, indicator that these audience consider the TNGO legitimate. Not least, the very act of "taking the meeting" with a TNGO indicates that the target audience has conferred legitimacy. Just as, for instance, opponents of negotiating with terrorists argue that doing so gives legitimacy to terrorists and their methods, so the very decision to "take the meeting" with a TNGO indicates a measure of legitimacy that the TNGO has standing to be heard.
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The examples that follow examine the diverse levels of legitimacy achieved by Transparency International in Germany and France -that is, the varying degrees to which these groups were accepted as legitimate policy advocates by their respective target audiences -by drawing on evidence from public statements by government and business officials, newspaper reports, self-assessments by TI leaders, and interviews with TI leaders and government officials. Before turning to this evidence, the next section provides an overview of Transparency International and its activities during the emergence of the international regime of anti-corruption in the 1990s. In the late 1990s, corruption became a major international policy problem to be entertained for the first time in international law. The end of the cold war, the liberalization of the global economy and the advance of globalization, the spread of liberal democratic principles, and the emergence of game-changing corruption scandals among business and political elites in Western Europe brought about a shift in global norms about corruption. Where once prevailed the attitude that corruption was a problem to be tolerated in developing countries in exchange for global political stability, or even that corruption might be beneficial to development and modernization, during this period corruption was redefined as a "cancer" to be stamped out of the global economy, wherein no country was immune from its scourge. Each national chapter is indigenous, wholly locally owned, and responsible for determining national programs of action to suit national circumstances. 29 While there has been no generalized social movement that has pressured governments to comply with their anti-corruption commitments, the role of TI has been to operate through elite networks to persuade important decision-makers in the direction of anti-corruption 
Transparency International and the

Transparency International in Germany
Transparency International in Germany was accepted as highly legitimate by two key target audiences for its advocacy against transnational bribery: major business leaders and government policy makers. In addition, TI received favourable press coverage in the media in Germany and was widely recognized as an important advocate on issues related to anti-corruption in development assistance, international business practices, and domestic politics in Germany.
To begin with, in 1993 a small group of German former-World Bank executives and academics working on a volunteer basis established both TI's national chapter in smooth the way in international business transactions. The prevailing assumption among business and government in Germany at the time was that "without this 'lubricant' no business can take place" and therefore transnational bribes were acceptable -and also tax-deductible -business expenses.
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At the outset both business and government opposed changes in German policy regarding transnational bribery and resisted TI's anti-corruption advocacy on this.
According to TI's managing director at that time, Hansjorg Elshosrt, there was "clearly a strong opposition of European business against TI because they felt that corruption is a At the same time, the shift from early resistance to full acceptance suggests that far from being automatically accepted, TI was able to construct this legitimacy. It did so through two key means: elite social networks, and a non-confrontational strategy.
Elite Social Networks
TI's presence in Germany, and indeed its organizational development and rise from a small operation to a prominent international TNGO, benefited from the activities and personal, elite connections of at least three key 
Non-Confrontational Strategy
In addition to its access to elite social networks, TI owes much of its legitimacy in Germany to its allegiance to non-confrontational, "consensus-building" strategies for promoting anti-corruption among its target audiences in business and government. From the outset TI eschewed scandal, public muckraking, or the "outing" of particular firms engaged in corrupt practices. Rather the strategic approach of the organization was to raise awareness about the harmful effects of corruption, to develop and disseminate produced a comprehensive anti-corruption "source book" and specialized anti-corruption "tool-kits" to support the work of anti-corruption activists in a variety of contexts and translated these materials into several languages, including Albanian, Portuguese, Romanian, Serbian, Spanish, and French. 47 They also disseminated research on corruption through independent and joint publications, and through its web-based 'corruption on-line research information services', which compiled and published a list of "daily corruption news" items from a variety of international news sources. Notably, TI generated no such news on its own. Explicitly eschewing the investigation of alleged corruption or any attempt to "name and shame" corrupt actors, TI's non-confrontational "inside-the-tent" approach to international anti-corruption lent it credibility and trust among the multinational corporations, governments, private foundations, and other likeminded public interest groups it engaged to build consensus and anti-corruption progress through persuasive means.
This non-confrontational strategy was at the fore when, during the second part of the 1990s, TI's shifted the focus of much of its international activity to the promotion of the anti-bribery initiatives promulgated by the OECD. 48 In Germany TI worked especially hard to persuade business and policymakers to its stance that German businesses and citizens ought not to export corruption and corrupt business practices to foreign countries. Michael Wiehen described TI-Germany's activities on behalf of the OECD anti-corruption program as follows:
We articulate the demand. We were I think the only organization that took an interest in the German law changes to implement the Convention. We have our position on the TI website, we talk about it regularly …the Handelsblatt, one of the leading business papers in Germany, quotes me on this point. … We perform a function to start the debate, to keep the debate going, and to make sure that from time to time the public is informed about the issue." shift in attitude in Germany on transnational bribery. Richard Weizsacker, the much respected former German President, presided over several of these meetings and was a key figurehead. Through the course of these meetings, Peter Eigen personally made the case to leading German multinationals that they ought to change their approach to foreign corrupt practices and agree to curb bribery in their international business activities.
Eigen argued to the business leaders that bribery in their international business transactions simply was not necessary and, moreover, that it was possible to eradicate it and effectively solve the competitive dilemma that induced companies to employ such practices. He also argued that German companies should take an active leadership role in promoting and supporting international efforts to curb bribery in international business.
They were to do this in two steps: first, by adopting TI's "Integrity Pact" model for cooperation among businesses to mutually reject foreign bribery in competitive contracts;
and, second, by pushing the German government to take a leadership position at the OECD to help prevent bribery internationally, by getting competitor states to adopt functionally equivalent anti-bribery policies.
As presented by Eigen in these meetings, TI's normative arguments proved Eigen's description of the course of these events is worth quoting at length:
Now TI managed to change this, managed to really change this consensus. And we mainly worked with big business in Germany. We had confidential meetings with leaders of German large companies … three leaders in four years. Some of them were chaired by Richard Weizsacker, the former President, therefore we were able to attract some really high level policy makers in these meetings. And we gradually led to a recognition by these people that what they were doing was corruption. And more importantly, that this type of corruption was extremely destructive in the economies in which they operated, and that it was very risky to them -at the time, some German companies had been caught [bribing] in Singapore, and places like this -and that, in our opinion, it was possible to stop bribing without losing business. And this squaring the peg was something which we managed to convey to them.
[…]
[…] and at that time we made the leaders of these companies sign an open letter to their ministers who were in charge of the OECD negotiations. And that open letter has been signed by around 20 people, including Siemens -this was the chairman of the board of Siemens -including Daimler-Chrysler, including Lufthansa, including Bosch, including Deutsche Telecomm, and including also a few American companies.
This is an open letter which has been signed by the business community and sent to the various ministers, in which they basically urged the ministers to sign the Convention. And that must have been in 1997 … And from then on, the companies helped us to push the Convention. Partly, it was the assumption that it will probably not succeed to get a Convention. But each of the countries wanted to be seen to push it, and probably most of them were surprised that the Convention was actually signed in December 1997. And I was surprised. I have never seen a Convention signed so quickly.
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In sum, TI in Germany played a key role in changing business attitudes and government policy towards foreign bribery. Considering the social and political barriers to discussing corruption in German business circles in the early 1990s, this was not an easy feat. In 1997 Eigen noted that "just five years ago you couldn't even get German companies to admit they gave bribes in the developing world. … The subject was taboo to the same extent that the practice was widespread." 53 The change in attitude in
Germany about international corruption is especially noteworthy, considering that German businesses, in contrast to American, British, and even French business cultures, have tended to retain "bad habits" largely eradicated from most international business, such as corruption in purchasing, territorial and strictly formal hierarchies, and relative homogeneity among the governing business elite.
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Because of their membership in elite social networks and their commitment to a non-confrontational strategy for promoting anti-corruption policies, TI's German leaders were able to get the conversation started in Germany about curbing the supply-side of transnational bribery and, ultimately, the tide in Germany changed. Michael Wiehen of TI-Germany noted:
… the OECD Convention wasn't exactly invented by us. But we took it as a godsend that somebody had thought of drafting it and we put all our weight behind getting the Convention passed. Without us in the critical summer of '97, without our pressure through business, the Convention would not have passed. TI was able to play such a critical role because its target audiences in business and government conferred sufficient legitimacy on the group to grant them access and the opportunity to persuade. TI's leaders in Germany were able to sit down, in person, in closed meetings with business and government elites to present their anti-corruption arguments. As students of administrative behaviour have noted, "administrators manifest a markedly more moral attitude in those cases in which they have to explain and defend their decisions in person -to someone sitting just a cross a desk from them, rather than to someone reading their bureaucratese thousands of miles away." 56 TI's legitimacy among and personal access to its target audience for norm articulation in Germany was crucial.
Transparency International in France
In stark contrast to the case of TI in Germany, both the transnational TI and throughout a drawn-out period of controversy during which France delayed its ratification and compliance with the Convention's requirements (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) 
Conclusion
Transparency International emerged in the 1990s as a highly influential TNGO advocating for international anti-corruption and, in particular, new norms developed at the OECD against transnational bribery. This non-state actor proved especially influential on anti-bribery policies in Germany, where business leaders and government officials took meetings with TI leaders, affiliated themselves with the organization, provided financial support, and opened themselves to persuasion and policy change. They accorded TI legitimacy such that it had standing to advocate its anti-corruption arguments to them and play a key role in policy formulation. In short, in Germany the elite personal connections of its leaders and its non-confrontational strategy for advancing its aims accorded TI a high level of legitimacy among its target audiences in business and government.
In contrast, in France, where TI possessed the same elite networks and pursued the same non-confrontational strategies, its target audiences in business and government did not confer legitimacy. TI was derided in the press, excluded from important anticorruption policy meetings, and dismissed by the government; it was not accepted as a legitimate participant with standing on the matter, or with the right or appropriate position to advocate, persuade, and be heeded. It was therefore an ineffectual policy advocate in France.
This comparison demonstrates that achieving legitimacy is not solely a matter of specific objective characteristics of the TNGO, nor of the tangible and intangible "sources" of legitimacy often identified in the literature. Rather, whether or not a specific TNGO will be accepted as a legitimate advocate on any policy depends also on the relationship of the TNGO with relevant target audiences and the acceptance of the organization by those audiences, as a function of the audience's values and not the advocate's.
The experience of Transparency International in Germany and France also shows that legitimacy matters. Although not necessarily sufficient, legitimacy is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of TNGO advocacy and norm entrepreneurship. Further, this legitimacy is best conceived as a subjective, relational, and sociological matter. What matters to the effectiveness of TNGO advocacy is not an objective measure of legitimacy.
It is rather the extent to which relevant audiences confer that legitimacy. This analysis carries important implications for the strategies of TNGOS seeking to influence the policies of states and other actors in particular issue areas: TNGOs and policy advocates deficient in legitimacy need to recognize this liability and then strategically seek to acquire and build legitimacy by appealing to the specific legitimacy criteria valued by particular audiences. In addition to its subjective and sociological conception, legitimacy therefore is also conceived here as an endogenous variable, which actors can strategically manufacture and generate through their own activities.
